

**UNCLASSIFIED**



# Countering Irregular Threats

**Col Jeff Bearor, USMC (Ret)**  
**USMC Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning**


**UNCLASSIFIED**



# The Environment

- Develop Balanced Capabilities

- Irregular/Non-Traditional ... Traditional
- Kinetic and Non-kinetic



## Marine Corps Operational Domain Trending into the Irregular Quadrant

- Across the range of military operations Shaping & Deterrence to SSTR (Phase 0 - Phase 5)



# Irregular Warfare

- **“Irregular warfare is a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over relevant populations. IW favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capabilities, in order to erode an adversary's power, influence, and will.”**

(definition approved by DAWG 6 Feb 2007)


- **ACMC says “War is War!”**
- **“The peoples of the world are becoming more connected...you can’t go back to the way things were...the 21<sup>st</sup> century is not on the side of lumbering conventional organizations like the Pentagon.”**

(Juan Cole, U of MI, 6 Jun 07)



# Historic IrW Trends


- Increasing role of irregular actors in conflict





# Historic IrW Trends

- Emergence of IW
- Steady conventional combat
- Decreased PKO
- Increased HA





# Likelihood of Future IrW Ops

- IW 5x as likely as conventional combat
- HA and NEO likely to also play big role in USMC ops

Scale of 0 to 2

|                   |      |
|-------------------|------|
| IW                | 1.5  |
| HA                | 1.15 |
| NEO               | 1.05 |
| PO                | 0.65 |
| Major contingency | 0.3  |



# Future Threat Predictions

- Heavy emphasis on irregular enemies
  - Little to no mention of conventional combat in USMC Threat Estimate (2005-2015)
- Major influential factors:
  - Increase in NGO and “other” presence
  - Non-conventional tactics by irregular enemies
  - Very different operating environments than past
    - Urban areas in developing world
    - Increased civilian presence
    - No front lines
- Requisite skills include:
  - IO and counter-IO
  - CAS coordination with difficult ground references/urban environment
  - PID of enemy among non-combatants
  - Increased cultural awareness and language abilities
  - Among many, many others



# QDR IrW Background

- **Strategic Situation**
  - US is involved in a “Long War”
  - Enemies do not use traditional military tactics
  - Requires DoD/Services to adopt unconventional and indirect approaches
  - Focus transformation efforts against irregular challenges
- **IW Findings**
  - US military organized/trained & educated/equipped for traditional war
  - DoD underinvested in both GPF and SOF capabilities and capacities for protracted IW
- **DoD Objectives**
  - Increase IW capabilities and capacities in GPF
  - Develop IW capabilities and capacities for “long war”
- **DoD Outcomes**
  - Rebalance GPF capabilities and capacities for long duration COIN ops
  - Increase SOF capacities and capabilities
  - Rebalance joint & service unit and individual Training and Education
  - Manage DoD people to meet IW requirements



# QDR IrW Roadmap Implementation

---

- **Principles**

- Avoid duplication of efforts
- Examine what steps have been taken already to increase IW capability and capacity
- Maximize existing programs, people and organizations
- Minimize creation of IW unique elements
- Improve integration of civ and military IW efforts

- **MAKE PROSECUTION OF OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE IW A CORE COMPETENCY OF DOD.**

(DoD QDR IW Execution Roadmap April 2006)



# Stability, Security, Transition, Reconstruction Operations

---

**“It is a DoD policy that:**

**Stability operations are a core U.S. military mission that the Department of Defense shall be prepared to conduct and support.**

**They shall be given priority comparable to combat operations and be explicitly addressed and integrated across all DoD activities...”**

**(DoDD 3000.05, 28 Nov 2005)**



# IrW Key Questions

- Key IrW question:  
Are current irregular warfare operations (Iraq, Afghanistan, broader war on terrorism) an aberration, or do they represent the “face” of warfare for the foreseeable future?
- Should we optimize for conventional conflict and ‘hedge’ for Irregular Warfare, or *vice versa*?
- What does an appropriate IrW capability look like?
- How much capacity for Irregular Warfare is enough?
- How do we get the T&E we need?
- What needs to change in military T&E?
- How do we maximize our superb human capital?



# Irregular Warfare/COIN

## Problem Definition

---

**“...the US does not have an effective irregular warfare doctrine, nor is it applying the appropriate ratio of political to military effort required to successfully wage COIN.”**

**Dr. John Hillen, Asst SecState for Pol/Mil Affairs**

**“Insurgency is here to stay...that insurgency will not end with Iraq and Afghanistan.”**

**“Our enemies...are strategic...will probe for weak points...attack our allies...harass our aid missions...infiltrate failed states to gain leverage...”**

**Dr. Jeb Nadaner, Dep Asst SecDef for Stability Ops**

**“...we’d better be thinking about Irregular Warfare in terms of two generations (of time)...”**

**Gen. Charles Wilhelm, USMC (Ret)**

**“...the US never developed the civilian side of COIN...US civilian institutions not designed to implement/support COIN...the military has been reluctant to tackle the seemingly muddled tasks and outcomes of COIN...”**

**“Americans like to think of COIN as an optional type of war. This should not be the case.”**

**Dr. Elliot Cohen, Johns Hopkins SAIS**

**“...lessons of COIN easy to forget...insurgency is war, but it is not war...despite technology, insurgents still depend on popular support...COIN is more effective when it is multilateral...trans-national COIN must use a multidisciplinary approach including legal/political/military/economic aid...”**

**LtGen Sir John Kisley, Director UK Defence Academy**

# Irregular Warfare/COIN

## Best Practices



**“...best COIN practices...understand the history and culture of the people in the environment...comprehend key actors and their influence...understand the indig people and the stresses of their everyday situation...language – even enough to break the ice was useful...understand and address the grievances of the population and trace them back to the enemy – IO and PSYOPs...reconstruction is very, very important...at a basic level we need the other agencies in the fight...”**

**COL H.R. McMasters, USA**

**“...ten competencies – five listed here...knowledge of our enemies and the operational environment-cultural, historic, anthropological intelligence...harness cultural/language expertise of US “heritage” communities...effective diplomacy...effective COIN model...planning capability in the non-military agencies...”**

**Dr. Jeb Nadaner, Dep Asst SecDef for Stability Ops**


**“Intelligence is key...isolate insurgents from the population...secure areas where insurgents have been cleared...IO and PSYOPs are necessary...police must lead COIN effort...”**

**Dr. Kalev Sepp, NPGS**

**“Unity of effort...One war approach...overcome bureaucratic impediments...must learn on the fly and adapt better than the insurgents...understand the culture we are operating in...”**

**Amb Eric Edelman, Under SecDef for Policy**

# Relationships IrW / MCO / SSTR



# Multiple GWOT-IrW-Long War Players-Actions-Activities



Force Posture/  
Structure Analyses

*MCU*

ConPlan  
7500

*ONR*

S&T Plan  
for IW

Tagging  
Tracking

Strategic  
Comms

*MarSoc*

IW

*CCO*

Roadmap

*MCWL*

*SSTR*

Building Partner  
Capacity

*TECOM*

*COIN*

Force Structure,  
Language, Culture,  
Readiness, Training,  
Education, COE, JOC

Non-Lethal Tech  
Investment Plan

USMC  
Growth  
202K



# IrW Challenges

---

- **USMC must retain rapidly deployable, combined-arms war fighting capabilities – a given;**  
*at the same time*
- **USMC must increase capabilities to conduct long-duration ops in IW environment – as tasked by CMC and QDR;**  
*in a*
- **Resource constrained environment – especially “time-to-train”**  
*therefore*
- **USMC must have a fully coordinated and integrated effort that can rapidly institute change across the Corps**



# Irregular Warfare Lines of Operation





# Operational Culture

---


Not culture for the sake of culture, but a **reasonable amount of operationally focused training and education**, to ensure **Marines** and leaders make **informed decisions and understand the cultural impacts** of tactical and operational decisions.

Culturally Aware and Adept  
During  
Planning and Execution of Military Operations  
Across the Spectrum of Conflict

# Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning



Training / Education



Expanding #  
Of players and  
Products



## TECOM

= Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning

- Understand cultural terrain's effect on operations.
- **Ensure planning includes cultural considerations.**
- Ensure Marines consider indigenous view of actions.
- **“One-Stop” operational culture/language training.**
- Operational culture training in every level of T&E.
- **Track career Marines' regional knowledge as commander's resource.**
- Provide “function-focused” language ability.
- **Use language aids and technology.**

**Prepare Marines to Successfully “Navigate the Cultural/Human Terrain”**



# OCL Training Concepts

## Operational Culture throughout Training & Education Continuum

- 1) **Operational Forces Pre-Deployment Training Operational Culture/Language**  
Iraq/OIF, Afghanistan/OEF, Caucasus/GSSOP, Africa/FMTU, MEUs and more  
Classroom, Field Exercises, Leader Exercises, Advisor Training,  
DL Products, Take-away Products, Reach-back and Web Support
- 2) **Officer and Enlisted Training and Professional Education**  
ELT through all levels of PME.
- 3) **Career Marines Distance Learning**  
Regionally focused learning via DL to create depth of knowledge
- 4) **Language Familiarization**  
Learning Centers at 8 USMC bases/stations
- 5) **Leverage International Affairs Officers**  
-Manpower processes support overall effort.

*Established Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning*



# IrW Opportunities

- Leverage TECOM capability to influence the action across T&E spectrum including PTP – **declare CG TECOM the “*IrW change-agent*”**
- USMC takes advantage of superb junior Marines and superior training capabilities to give Marines IrW abilities by:
  - Leveraging/coordinating/operationalizing current DO and EPME/T projects
  - Identifying (*Done*) and filling (*In Work*) COIN training gaps
  - Integrating the “non-traditional” and “irregular” into everything we do so it becomes SOP in schools and operating forces
  - Building upon TECOM as the Corps’ “change-agent” - increase focus on training to improve capabilities for: COIN, Integrated Intell Ops, SSTR, CMO, IO, Joint/Interagency/Coalition Ops; coordinate across DOTMLPF
  - Coordinating across T&E Continuum:
    - Individual training / PME
    - Unit training / T&R
    - PTP and Advisor Trng
    - “Next CAX” and Unit Assessment



# USMC IrW End State

## End State

- Fully integrated IrW capability focused on enhanced training and education.
  - “Mainstream” and integrate IrW/COIN/SSTRO concepts and methods
  - Retain IrW/COIN “Corporate Knowledge”– eliminate future learning curve
  - “One stop” coordinating activity for USMC change activities
  - Improve performance in current IrW fights
  - Improve PTP and plan “Next CAX” with view to balanced capabilities
- One MCCDC IrW “voice” in the Joint/Inter-agency arenas coordinated with PPO/HQMC.
- Coordinate across DOTMLPF.
- Answer the QDR IrW Execution Roadmap and other DoD mail in coord with PPO/HQMC.
- Focus on and take advantage of our superb Human Capital through T&E.
- Get the Balance Between Traditional and Irregular Right!



# The “Big” Question

---

- How do we best optimize people, training and education to prepare Marines to conduct long term, sustained, COIN and Irregular conflict?



---

# Questions

# Comments

# Discussion